Excellent. The Jerusalem Post runs an insightful interview with John Bolton during his stint at the Herzliya Conference in Jerusalem. I have never seen anything like it. Read it all - extraordinary, really. His remarks on Condi (and Bush) are quite revealing. Looking forward, the outlook is ominous. Very tough choices must be made - imminently.
During an hour-long interview before leaving
Herzliya's Daniel Hotel and heading to the first panel-packed day at
the campus of the Interdisciplinary Center, Bolton gave his take on
Gaza, Iran, Turkey and, of course, on the outgoing and incoming
American administrations.
Operation Cast Lead was timed to end immediately before US
President Barack Obama's inauguration. Since then, rockets have
continued to be fired on Israel from Gaza, with limited retaliation,
and preparations for a possible second round. Had Israel not pulled
out, would that have put an automatic strain on Jerusalem-Washington
relations?
I
do think the Obama administration will be less friendly to Israel than
the Bush administration. And I understand why the leadership in Israel
might have wanted the operation finished by January 20. There may have
been other reasons to stop, as well, although with the renewed
launching of rockets, those reasons are less apparent.
Military operations like Cast Lead should be carried through to
their own logical conclusions, and I think Israel has to calibrate its
military actions based on its own self-interest. Trying to judge what
it should do based on American politics is a perilous venture.
But doesn't Israel rely on the US? Can Israel "go it alone," without American approval?
Well, it has done so in the past. For example, it undertook the
very important operation, in September 2007, to destroy the North
Korean nuclear reactor in Syria. That was done, if not over US
opposition, certainly without US approval. Personally, I think that US
policy was wrong. I think Israel's destroying of that nuclear facility
was beneficial to international peace and security.
You're saying the US was actually against that operation?
Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice wanted very much to avoid
that strike. In fact, when Israel came to the US and first proposed it
in the spring of 2007, she urged that it be postponed indefinitely. The
Israeli response was, "We'll postpone it, but not past the end of the
summer."
And that's exactly what happened.
Speaking of Rice, she seemed to have shifted to the left over
the course of the Bush administration, particularly in its second term,
when she became secretary of state. Does it really make a difference,
then, whether it's Bush running the show or Obama?
Sadly from my perspective, there will be a lot of continuity
between the Obama and Bush administrations where Middle East policy is
concerned - generally on Iran, and specifically on a range of other
issues. That doesn't warm my heart. It shows that mistakes were being
made, especially during the second term of the Bush administration,
many of which were made at secretary Rice's behest.
Was this because Bush came to rely on her so heavily, or did he actually hold with her views?
He did trust and rely on her very extensively in the second
term, when a number of major voices of the first term left the
government in one way or another and others, like vice president
Cheney, had a much lower profile. I believe historians will judge that
Rice was the dominant - in fact, nearly exclusive - voice advising the
president on foreign policy in his second term.
Was he personally under her spell in some way, or did he change his mind about his own doctrine?
I can't explain it, quite frankly. It was a big disappointment
to see the changes that were made in a variety of policy areas. It was
one reason for my not seeking another appointment at the UN, and I
thought it appropriate to leave in December 2006, because the
administration had shifted on too many important foreign policy issues.
At last year's Herzliya Conference, you responded cynically
to the suggestion that Bush might bomb Iran before the end of his
presidency. Why, at the time, were you so certain he wouldn't do it?
Well, I had changed my view on that subject. I originally
thought that president Bush was prepared to use military force. He had
said repeatedly during his first term that an Iran with nuclear weapons
was unacceptable. And, being a man of his word, I thought that his use
of the word "unacceptable" meant it was not acceptable, and therefore
if diplomacy failed - which I was sure it would - that left the robust
response as the only option. I think what happened was that the
president was persuaded by secretary Rice that a military answer to the
Iranian nuclear threat would have provoked Iran to respond in Iraq, by
increasing its destabilizing activities. I happen to think that
analysis is incorrect - that Iran, if it retaliated at all, would
retaliate by having Hizbullah launch attacks on Israel. But I think
that secretary Rice persuaded the president that his biggest legacy in
Iraq could be threatened and undermined if Iran stepped up its
destabilizing activities.
From
what you know of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, do you think she
will take a similar view, or is it possible that she, ironically, might
take a more hard-line position on Iran?
Bill
and Hillary were a year ahead of me at Yale law school. I've known them
for a long time - not that we were close buddies. And my recollection
of Hillary was that she was one of the most radical leftists among the
students there. She has gone through a lot of changes since then, among
them in her political awareness, but I think fundamentally her views
have not changed. I would worry that she will fit right in to an Obama
administration, whose views are very European when it comes to a wide
variety of foreign policy issues.
The danger of a nuclear Iran is an issue around which there
is consensus across the Israeli political spectrum. In the event that
it becomes necessary, would it be legitimate for Israel to take
military action alone, if doing so were technically feasible?
Absolutely. With the end of the Bush administration, the
possibility of US use of military force against Iran's nuclear program
has dropped essentially to zero. The diplomatic effort failed years
ago, and I don't think any renewed American effort is fundamentally
going to make any difference. Iran has all the scientific and
technological knowledge it needs right now to create a nuclear weapon.
We can tell from publicly available information from the International
Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has enough low-enriched uranium which,
if enriched to weapons-grade levels, would allow it one nuclear weapon
now, and possibly another one or two this year. Let me stress here:
That's what we know publicly from the IAEA - no James Bond involved in that
calculation - and there may well be additional activities we don't know
about, which would make Iran's capability even more substantial. So, if
the diplomatic option has failed, that leaves only regime change or the
use of force. And with no likelihood of American use of force, that
leaves Israel.
Of course, the military option is a very unattractive one. It's
risky. You could end up with the worst of both worlds: taking action
without breaking Iran's control over the nuclear fuel cycles, and yet
incurring the disapproval of governments all over the world.
But you have to have the military option front and center, because the alternative is far more unattractive.
Now,
there are people who will say that Israel can't do it without American
approval, or that it's not possible technically. I don't believe any of
that is accurate, though I don't mean to downplay the risk involved.
But there's another thing that you have to keep in mind: The military
option is declining over time. This is because Iran will undoubtedly
take steps to disperse and harden its facilities even further. It will
increase its air defense capabilities by purchases from Russia. It will
do many things to make it even more difficult for the US or Israel to
take military action in the future.
So there's a very narrow window. If it closes, then you have to
contemplate what to do with a nuclear Iran. I've tried to stay away
from theorizing about how you deal with a nuclear Iran, because once
you start theorizing about it, in a way you're accepting it. But if the
reality is that Iran is now unimpeded - except for the possibility of a
military strike - then you have to start thinking about it. That's why
regime change starts coming back into the picture. The only long-range way to deal with this problem is
regime change. You can't contain a regime of religious fanatics. Their
calculus on the value of human life is very different from ours. If you
prize life in the hereafter more than life on earth, the deterrent
value of retaliation isn't very persuasive.
Look at the people who carried out 9/11. What threat of
retaliation would have deterred them from the suicide attack? The
answer is none. So, we're at a very grave point here. There's not much
time left to deal with Iran if you want to keep in non-nuclear. And
once it becomes nuclear, the entire balance of power in the region
shifts - not just for Israel, but for the Arab states in the Persian
Gulf as a whole. It will be a dramatically different region, because of
the substantial increase of influence that nuclear capability will give
the Iranians.
What good can changing this or that specific radical regime do, when the forces of jihad are global and exceed borders?
By regime change in Iran, I don't mean switching a few figures
at the top; I mean the elimination of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
The few cases of countries' having given up their nuclear weapons
programs have come at a time of regime change. For example, when South
Africa moved away from apartheid toward a true democracy, that's when
it gave up its nuclear weapons program. When the Soviet Union broke up,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus gave Russia back the nuclear weapons
that had been left on their territory, because they wanted a
non-nuclear future.
There's no guarantee that regime change in Iran would achieve
the same objective, but if there's any chance for that to happen, it's
when a new government says it doesn't want nuclear weapons, and does
want peace and stability. If that doesn't work, then the options are
even more unattractive. That's why this is such a critical point,
without much time remaining before we find out what happens when Iran
does get nuclear weapons.
It has been said that Iran's nuclear program is being set back by the global financial crisis and sanctions. Is that not true?
The fall in the price of oil globally has had a dramatic impact
on Iran. There's little doubt about that. And Iran's economy is in very
bad shape. There's little doubt about that, as well. But neither of
these two factors has anything to do with sanctions. Iran's economy is
in trouble because of nearly 30 years of misrule since the Islamic
Revolution. The lesson is: Don't put religious leaders in charge of an
economy. They have misinvested in Iran's oil infrastructure. They have
subsidized fuel prices to the point where they're now dependant on
importing refined petroleum products. You can see evidence of economic
dissatisfaction all around the country. But, again, that's not because
of the sanctions that have been imposed by the US or the Security
Council. Those sanctions have had a very limited impact.
[...]
What about UNRWA?
UNRWA is an example of an organization that should have ceased
to exist long ago, because its functions were transformed over time
from humanitarian to largely political. The idea that refugee status
can pass down through the generations is contrary to the principles of
international humanitarian law that the High Commissioner for Refugees
operates on elsewhere. And it shows 
why single-purpose organizations
like this often are self-defeating.
Apropos the passing down of refugee status through the
generations, if Hamas and Hizbullah are proxies of Iran, how can Israel
eliminate the threats they pose with this or that territorial
compromise, or this or that military operation?
It is a mistake to think that you can deal with the problem of
Hamas, Hizbullah or even the regime in Syria separately from the
problem of Iran. And neither of those three is disconnected from the
threat of Iranian nuclear weapons. Nor am I sure that you can deal with
all at once, without regime change in Teheran. This is not to say that
you have to have a macro solution to everything before you can have a
micro solution to anything. It is to say that as you approach these
threats and problems, you have to understand the linkages between them.
[...]
According to polls Binyamin Netanyahu - like you, a former
ambassador to the UN - is going to win Tuesday's election. Is it true,
as his opponents have been claiming, that Obama will not be able to
relate to him or his worldview?
I don't want to put myself in the middle of an Israeli election,
but it's a mistake to think that Obama won't deal with whomever becomes
prime minister of Israel, as he would deal with the leader of any
country, from whatever side of the political spectrum.
I do think, however, that how Israel should deal with the Obama
administration is to appoint a counterpart to George Mitchell as the
Israeli "special envoy" handling the Middle East peace process. I think
it's a mistake for the prime minister to deal directly with Mitchell.
He or she should deal with President Obama; the next foreign minister
should deal with Secretary of State Clinton; and Mr. or Ms. X should
deal with George Mitchell.
Mitchell has said that all conflicts can be solved, pointing
to Northern Ireland as his prime example. What can Israel expect from
his efforts on this front?
The Good Friday Agreement did not solve the Northern Ireland
conflict, which, after all, in one form or another, had been going on
for 500 years. It was solved by the British army thrashing the IRA.
What was negotiated in the Good Friday Agreement were the terms of
surrender. That hasn't happened in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank,
which in any case is a very different environment. As for what to
expect, well, this is probably the last major assignment of Mitchell's
career, so he has a strong incentive to reach a deal and do it quickly.
This means that its substance will be less important than the deal
itself, and that if reaching it drags out too long, it will be seen as
a failure on his part. This should be of particular concern to Israel.
Read the whole thing.
