THE THREE CARD MONTY OPTION

The day before yesterday Ambassador John Bolton declared the two state solution an abject failure, which was a very good thing.  He went on to suggest a three state policy where Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank (in some configuration) reverts  back to Jordan. I vehemently disagreed. This is JEWISH LAND. Period. Further, Jordan doesn't want it - they threw the  "Palestinians" out and murdered thousands of them - which is why Arafat set up camp in southern Lebanon (and we know how well that worked out).  And the last thing Jordan wants is Hamas setting up shop in its borders. Egypt clearly does not want Gaza (who would?)

The Nutsrallah and his nazis hate it, btw.

My friend and colleague John gave the proposal considerable thought after a furious flurry of  email exchanges. He has fleshed out the argument and I think it quite good. It's lengthy, so grab a coffee. Forgive Mr. Jay's seeing contempt for capital letters .....

if it aint' broke ......

there are several ways to look at a political status quo, especially if it is a less than desirable situation.  the current goings on between israel and gaza provides such a choice in view.—either chaotic descent into further decadent failure, … , or, the attempt of events nominally out of control to impose an odd sort of rationality upon themselves.  neither view implies stasis, and both views acknowledge a fluidity of events.  it seems to me that the best view of a less than desirable situation is that view which admits of some further approach to rational control of events, and here we apprehend human intervention into the flow of events, and posit a viable approach to the imposition of the constraints of rationality upon them.

this last additional element moves us from an objectifying abstraction to considerations of policy, and the intervention of considerations of human wills and aims.

and so, we come to my reactions to a very interesting paper written by former john r. bolton, former united states ambassador to the united nations, entitled “the three-state option” and appearing in washingtonpost.com, the post’s own transition to a more rational tomorrow given the decadent spiral of the printed newspaper into oblivion: even the post looks to a viable approach to a changing future.  the post may not like it, but it has chosen rational change.

ambassador bolton  advocates change, a frank abandonment of the theory of the palestinian authority  ever being viable governance over the “gaza territory,” and a re-absorption of gaza into egypt, and of the west bank into jordan.  ambassador bolton’s thesis finds encapsulation in these brief sentences, from which all else of his argument flows:

“among many anomalies, today’s conflict lies within the boundaries of three states nominally at peace.  having the two arab states re-extend their prior political authority is an authentic way to extend the zone of peace and, more important, build on governments that are providing peace and stability in their own countries.”

and, in an economy of exposition much lacking in the world, we have no further to go in see whether ambassadors bolton’s argument stand or fail than the assumptions built into the last sentence of the above excerpt.  and though i have unbounded respect, admiration and affection for mr. bolton and for the forthrightness of his argument, i think his view lends itself to further decadence of the gaza situation, and does not lend itself to rational constraints upon the violence found there.

what are the assumptions in that last paragraph?  they are:

1.)the exertion of governance by jordan and egypt over these territories somehow achieves a peace not achievable by the exertion of governance over them by israel, and

2.)this governance over the palestinian entities by the arab states somehow lends greater peace and stability to egypt and jordan.

i think the logic & argument premised on these assumptions flawed, as these assumptions fail under examination and question, at the very least to the extent, that ambassador bolton has a whole lot of further exposition to do, in order to convince the careful and cautious thinker that the “virtues” of the status quo be abandoned, and there are some, in order to seek some sort of quixotic refuge in a plan that very few people would adopt enthusiastically, and that many see as seriously flawed from the standpoint of their own naked self interests.  the two greatest objections to this three-state scheme coming, of course, from the two entities absolutely needed to agree to it, … , that being jordan and egypt. ambassador bolton recognizes this, and further recognizes that the only way around it is naked bribery, and a bit of overt pressure from the united states.  he writes:
“this idea would be decidedly unpopular in egypt and jordan, which have long sought to wash their hands of the palestinian problem.  accordingly, they should not have to reassume this responsibility alone.  they should receive financial and political support from the arab league and the west, as they both have for years from the united states.”

these sentences are brilliant, not (in my view) because of the policy in them, but because they at once recognize neither jordan nor egypt can be forced to take this bastard child back into a welcome home, and that the “carrot” to do so is the promise of more money and the “cudgel” applied if they choose not do so is to have the money they are receiving now cut off.  please read those sentences again, with a critical eye, and see if i have not explained them accurately. 

in short, ambassador bolton quite nakedly says that the currency of his solution to the problem is united states currency.  (one might well expect israel would be a recipient of such inducement as well.)  i am going to explain in just two words why his notion of the value of this currency to egypt and jordan is very grossly inflated, and i do this with both clarity and celerity.--

lebanon & hezbollah.
and, if you want a more elaborate explanation?  o.k., you got another word coming. iran.
the fallacy of ambassador bolton’s argument has been exposed in three words, and these three words explain why no one in the middle east is going to be even remotely persuaded by mr. bolton’s arguments, and why neither egypt nor jordan is even remotely interested in doing anything to see if they will in fact work.

it is not that lebanon is a power, of any sort.  it is precisely that lebanon is no power; that her former prosperity lies in wrack and ruin, her politics and economy in shambles; that her former promise that islam and christianity, indeed, or any form of secular existence, could live side by side with islam in a politics unmarred by zealotry and hate; and, that periodic violent upheaval is endemic to her political life, … ,  that this promise of progress now appears dead as a post.  lebanon stands a very eloquent and starkly obvious example of what a nation state once prosperous, orderly, and a fair model of political stability devolves into, decays into, under the pestilential influence of islamic extremism whose sole aim is the destruction of isreal, as envisioned and directed by the iranian theocracy.

let us meet the argument head on. ambassador bolton argues:
“keeping gaza politically separate from egypt may be optically satisfying to some, but doing so simply increases threats to egyptian stability  …  without a larger egyptian role, gaza will not, and perhaps cannot, achieve the minimal stability necessary for economic development.”

he says that keeping gaza separate from egypt threatens egypt’s stability.  my guess is, if ambassador bolton had a month of sundays he could not fill the back seat of a volkswagen with egyptian political analysts who would agree with him.  and, the very sad experience of lebanon stands in stark refutation of mr. boltons seemingly boundless optimism on this point: we all grew up with a truth which refutes mr. bolton,  and that is, “the bad apple spoils the barrel.”   lebanon is stark proof of this assertion.

the simple truth of the matter seems to be, that were gaza somehow forced upon egypt again, that egypt would not be able to exert any more control over hamas than israel was able to administratively, and that soon gazan radicalism would be exerting its scabrous and corrosive effects upon egypt’s domestic politics, and that the religious fanaticism of hamas would lead to the same decadence in egyptian politics as it has caused in gaza, and in lebanon.  a simple question sets up the proof of the cogency of these remarks.  am i right?  well, you may rest assured that the egyptians think that i am sufficiently right, that these concerns are sufficiently cogent for them to exercise extreme prudence in these matters, … , so much so that they have built a fence between egypt and gaza to keeps the gazans out  of egypt, and that they enforce embargoes on gaza, and do what they can to eliminate contact between gaza and egypt.  egypt certainly regards gaza as the proverbial bad apple, and sees in lebanon, stark proof of what the presence of radical islamic fundamentalism can do to the orderly administration of a secular state.

egypt is an arab and muslim state.  even so, egypt will not go to war to “protect” hamas, and states publically as a matter of governmental position, that hamas is getting what it deserves.  you may safely infer from this fact alone that egypt does not view the prospect of gaza being back under her sovereignty as a source of political stability.  and, g-d knows it is verity, that gaza is no kind of economic asset to anyone, and would be viewed by egypt as only a drain upon the state exchequer.

my guess is mr. bolton is wrong in his analysis simply as a matter of practicality, and that is, you could not pay egypt enough money to take gaza back under her wing, and you could not pay jordan enough money to take back the west bank.  neither state will undertake the risk of instability that such incorporation would entail.

and precisely here is the fatal weakness in mr. bolton’s argument, a flaw exposed in his own writing: “egypt no more wants responsibility for dealing with hamas than israel does.  cairo fears that hamas extremism, and its affinity for the muslim brotherhood, will increase the risk of extremism in egypt. strong ties exist between hamas and the muslim brotherhood, and extremism in egypt is growing, so already the real issue is finding the best way to control the threat simultaneously in egypt and gaza. keeping gaza politically separate from egypt may be optically satisfying to some, but doing so simply increases the threats to egyptian stability, the loss of which would be catastrophic for the broader region.”

the flaw in the argument lies in the “optically satisfying to some” sentence, which is a great rhetorical flourish, but if you will examine that paragraph structurally in terms of syntax, and in terms of logic, you will see that mr. bolton entirely omits the intermediate premises upon which the proof of the transition from the ground of egytian destabilization from the influence of hamas, to that golden era of stability derived from a union of gaza and egypt is premised.  in short, mr. bolton has left out the middle grounds of his argument which shows how this transition may somehow be made, and simply arrives at the conclusion of his argument.  unfortunately, he has left out precisely how this result is to be obtained.

the egyptians ain’t buying it, and neither am i.  he simply has supplied no reasons based upon fact, history, human motivation, or a reconciliation of the realities of radical islam in the presence of the structure of a secular state, which can sustain his rosy view of this “stability.”

until mr. bolton can do this somehow, the egyptians and the jordanians are going to remain as unconvinced as i.  and, i hope, gentle reader, if i have done my argument convincingly, as you.

the same arguments apply to the west bank and jordan.  and with perhaps more force.  does mr. bolton forget the unhappy tenure of the palestinians in jordan, and the violent lengths to which jordan went to drive them from her midst?  it is not a happy chapter in the history of the middle east.  others can supply the statistics on how many were killed to effect the p.l.o./palestinian eviction from jordan, but it was a significant number.  and, a very nasty session arriving at those numbers.  the matter remains fresh, both as to jordan, and the palestinians, hardly a situation guaranteeing an “amicable reunion.”

jordan will not be persuaded under any circumstance, now or in future, to take the palestinians “back.”  it is not going to happen. this factor, in and of itself is most interesting.—history seems to posit an almost inexhaustible lust on the part of nation states to acquire territory, whether by conquest or forced annexation.  i have never heard of another instance where countries were bribed to take over territory once taken from them, nor, moreover have ever heard of an instance where a nation states lust was so attenuated by bitter experience with the territory, that it turned down the bribe.  the fact that the states involved now perceive the loss of those territories as being likely providential in stature, should alone temper mr. bolton’s enthusiasms for the probable success of his plan!!

but, let us deal with mr. bolton’s further assumption that somehow re-absorption of gaza and the west back into jordan and egypt somehow confers more stability in the region.

what he means by stability is not very well defined in his post, but, what he means, of course, is that somehow the arab states find a way to eliminate the fanatical religious violence that emanates from hamas and the palestinians directed at israel.  nor, of course, can mr. bolton mention this directly, or bring this topic near the surface of his argument, for to do so is to give lie to the very assumption of political accord in the region.  it is only to read the charter of hamas, the organic document of its foundation, to know that neither egypt or jordan can ever do anything to take the zeal from the hamas and palestinian drive to destroy israel, simply because this drive is not predicated on the issues of statehood, or of economic prosperity, or self determination, or any of the other trappings that come with living in a stable, ordered and prosperous society: the drive is based upon religious belief and faith finding its source in the islamic koran and hiddathas.  put simply, the aggressive drive to destroy israil is based upon religious fanaticism and is held by religious fanatics who care not one whit for other considerations.

in a very real sense, economic and material prosperity run counter to those conditions which make hamas recruitment and survival amongst the populace assured.  these conditions, even if somehow achieved, (and this prospect with the context of arab and islamic politics is a pretty narrow condition), would not assure stability in a nation, or in the region.  it is hard to achieve stability in a country or a region when the prime source of instability and violence is not at all interested in stability, and to whom stability actually presents a hindrance to its goals.  in short, hamas is never going to play into mr. bolton’s vision of stability.  ever.

hamas would be the same problem to egypt as it was to israel in the administration of gaza.  unless hamas and abbas and the other similar splinter groups can somehow be eradicated there is nothing to suggest in any of this that the egyptians would be any more successful than the israelis in bringing stability to gaza.  there is much to suggest that they would be even less successful.  moreover, there is very little to suggest that the egyptians could do it in any other manner than what the israeli’s are doing right now, and that is by the periodic application of draconian military force, and i expect they would be far less kind and mindful of civilian casualties.  in short, there appears nothing magical about putting gaza and the west bank under the control and jurisdiction of arab governments, and nothing to suggest that to do so automatically stamps out the problems associated with fanatical sectarian motives and violence.  nor, is there anything in mr. bolton’s remarks that would lend guidance and reassurance to either the egyptians or the jordanians, for that matter, that hamas and the palestinians would be any less disruptive upon their societies than upon israel's, or any less disruptive than they were in the past while part of those states. there is another bulwark of mr. bolton’s proposal.--

as evident for being unstated, mr. bolton's argument also presupposes that the involvement of nation states in this matter of gaza and the west bank reduces or eliminates the risk of war between israel, egypt and jordon,  thereby lending stability and additional prospects for prosperity in the region, which he does state directly. at the very heart of this subliminal argument, lies again the presuppositions that arab nation states can somehow reign in hamas, and the other iranian proxy militias, where israel could not, and, curiously, that if they cannot, it still will not lead to war.  i think mr. bolton in error in this, and that in fact, the probability of nation state war is heightened if, in mr. bolton’s words, gaza and the west bank lie within the actual territory of three states nominally not at war.

the current war between israel and gaza, under the egis of hama, is a result of years of terrorist provocations by hamas against the israeli population, most notably in the form of the missile attacks into southern isreal, but there have been countless other attacks and indignities committed by gazans upon the population of israel.

this is what caused this war.

for mr. bolton’s arguments to have any terrier, for them to sustain intellectual growth in a soil conducive to support of his tenets for a three-state solution, there somehow has to be some showing or proof that egypt could have done more to prevent these attacks by hamas and abbas and others than the combined efforts of the israeli military or israeli intelligence.  the reason i say that is pretty simple.  the attacks suffered by israel to date proved sufficient to provoke the response that led to the counterattack.  what it took to provoke war is now quantified, more or less.  it follows then, from a logical and quantitative sense, that if war is somehow to be avoided, if a response was to have been avoided, fewer provocations  would have had to have been involved of a qualitatively less damaging effect upon the israeli citizenry.  simply put, for mr. bolton’s arguments to have credence, and qualities of persuasion, he has to be able to argue credibly if not persuasively, that egypt could have prevented hamas from carrying on these attacks, or to have been able to decrease their frequency, violence and damaging effect.

how can mr. bolton show that?

if mr. bolton cannot show that, or at least credibly argue it, then we have to accept as established, that israel would suffer even more of the same from hamas and abbas than it has, and more of what drove israel to war.  then the only thing he can argue in support of a contention of a lessoned prospect for war is that the prospect of israel going to war with the combined nation state of gaza & egypt proper is a deterrent of sufficiently greater magnitude that israel would in fact suffer more indignity, more harm, more damage, more civilian deaths, more kidnappings of its soldiers, more attack and suicide bombings, in order to avoid conflicts of greater magnitudes with nation states.  in other words, that rather than engage in even more destructive wars, israel would be willing to suffer a greater quantum of damage, indignity and death.

i think this a cogent and coherent observation.  i will leave it to the reader to decide.

if it is a cogent observation, then it seems to me that mr. bolton has a very serious obstacle to face in promoting his plan, and an obstacle which renders it impracticable if not outright impossible. how, under these circumstances, if my argument is plausible, is israel going to be encouraged to seek and embrace mr. bolton’s “three-state” plan for peace.  these are hardly the stuff of inducement or encouragement, to enter into an agreement whose dynamic seems to engender being attacked by islamic extremism, when the whole point of israel’s policy has been to eliminate such attack and to eliminate the attackers.  being subject to greater quantum’s of suffering, absorbing more unbearable punishment, suffering greater and more deadly attacks, … , this is hardly the stuff work to encourage israel seeking the inclusion of these territories into the territorial boundaries proper of egypt and jordan.

now, if i have framed this argument correctly, it would appear to me that mr. bolton has some problems making his suggestions practicable to both israel and the arab states.

and, he has some further difficulty in the very premise of his plan, and that is justifying a departure from the status quo.  this is because the status quo, oddly enough, has some virtues and some rational underpinnings which are not included in mr. bolton’s vision of progress and rationality.  here i invoke though hardly prove in any sense, a doctrine metaphorically akin to adam smith’s “unseen hand” in the field of economics.  it is as though while pursuing the chaotic history of this middle eastern violence and warfare, the desires and motives and aims of the participants have struggled toward a rather imperfect equilibrium which does tend, somehow, blindly and imperfectly to have driven the parties to a political structure which tends to minimize the risk of war.  there are factors which have somehow been interjected into this whole mess, which rather inhibit the prospect of regional war, and which tend, in a very subtle way, to minimize the risk of greater conflict.

it is, of course, my contention that incorporation of these territories into the nations of egypt and jordan will not eliminate the radicalism from the territories, and in case of gaza, will probably increase it with the added communication between hamas and the muslim brotherhood, the actual well spring of its radical religious zealotry. if this is the case and a proper analysis, it means perforce that terrorist attack from gaza in the form of rocket launches and other attacks will in all probability increase, and not decrease.  again, i see nothing in mr. bolton’s argument that persuasively suggests otherwise.

if that is the case, israel will have to act precisely as she has done this time, and go into gaza and try to take out the infrastructure and organization that is launching the attacks, as well as destroying the bases and facilities responsible.

as big a head ache for israel and the whole world and for the arab nation states as the situation is right now, it is far better just to leave it as it is.  it is best not to mess with the status quo.  these problems of hamas aggression are not going to go away, but it is much easier for israel and the world to deal with then to deal with the militaries of the nation states implicated by john bolton’s plan.  and, here is the added virtue of the status quo, it is far easier for the arab nation states to deal with this militarily and diplomatically as well given the status quo, then if they administered gaza and the west bank, or if they were part of their nations.  the egyptians know what a tremendous pain in the ass hamas is, they have stated publically who has brought on this conflict, and whose fault it is, and they have said they will not intervene.  in fact, the implication is clear, egypt would dearly love to see hamas destroyed.  in short, egypt gets to treat hamas and gaza as if they were a foreign country whose fact she was totally indifferent to, or whose destruction she favored.

by way of very stark contrast, were gaza part of egypt, and were israel subject to the same kinds and same levels of attack from gaza as provoked this military incursion into gaza, israel would still have no option but to go to war, or face the piece meal destruction of that bond between sovereign and subject without which no state long survives, that bond being the ability of a nation state to protect its citizen.  and if the state is to survive, it must protect that bond and unity between itself and its citizens, regardless of who aggresses upon it.  in short, the provocation for war is the same if its source is a rag tag group like hamas existing in gaza, or if it is a terrorist group like hamas existing in and as part of a nation state.

in the situation as exists, if israel needs to attack, it does not necessarily implicate either egypt or jordan.  they are free to stay from the fray if they choose which they have chosen this time.  that choice is not always assured, but it lays open for the taking, as it was taken this time by all the arab nations.  (and, oddly enough, by hezbollah.  odd that.)

the contrast is just as stark, if we suppose gaza part of egypt. again, when israel deals with these thugs as they are presently constituted, it is not involving itself in an attack upon a portion of a genuine nation state, such as egypt, and if it is in the interests of the adjoining arab nation states to stay the hell out of the conflict, they may stay the hell out of the conflict.  it would be, perforce, an entirely different matter were israel to move into gaza, or conduct any operations affecting gaza, were gaza part of egypt.  egypt would never have the option to just stand by, she would be forced to defend “her” people and “her” territory, or else violate all of the imperatives which make the survival of a nation possible.  would the united states be much of a nation were maine to come under armed attack by canadian lobstermen, and the united states said, no thanks, we standing this one out.  it is not the way nations maintain cohesion and unity. the level of hamas terror and provocation being no less with gaza being part of egypt, the level of the risk of war involving the militaries of nation states in the middle east goes up incredibly.  if gaza had been part of egypt while this level of terrorist attack had sustained itself over the last 3 or 4 years this has been coming to a head, can it be said that israel would have waited another year to assert her rights as a nation state to be free from this kind of attack?  can it be said that israel would never go to war with egypt over this kind of terrorism? 

in my view the answer to both questions is no, israel could not and would not suffer any greater abuse than she has, had the source of the missiles and the kidnappings and the bombings been from egypt, rather than gaza.  and, instead of war with hamas, israel would now be ten days into full scale nation state war with egypt, and perhaps other nation states with whom she is allied.  you may pick any number of likely candidates from the rosters of the arab league.  does it need be argued, if the point is found logical, that this would present a disastrously more dangerous and destructive situation than we have this day, to include a far larger circus for the carrying on of conventional war, and to include the risk of nuclear war.

in my view, unless ambassador bolton can positively demonstrate that the incorporation of these territories into egypt and jordan would result in a quantum level decrease in attacks against israel, in a quantum level decrease in missiles, kidnappings, bombings, murders and the like, being used against israel, then his argument for changing the status quo as premises upon more stability and the lessening of the risk of war, utterly and absolutely fails.  and, it seems to me, that if he cannot even make a credible argument to this effect, he cannot in good faith justify a departure from the status quo that now prevails in the middle east.

and, if my analysis is at all correct, the departure from the status quo suggested by ambassador bolton not only increases the risk of war, it practically guarantees that it has a far wider scope and is far more deadly, far more destructive of human life and property, than anything dreamt under the sun involving just israel and hamas.

there is an added factor, kind of a make weight or a debaters trick in a way, but also a matter of some substance.  the reader will have to decide how much credence is to be lent to the argument by mentioning this.  it is, in a way, a matter of bias or outright prejudice, but, in my view, something at least worthy of consideration and it has to do with the nature of warfare and who wages it.  we have heard much in the media about “disporportionality,” much of it unqualified bullshit in my estimation and clearly the pap of soft headed and partisan leftists, … , but i would like the reader to consider this.  were egypt to somehow have gotten messed up in this, or were egypt charged with keeping domestic order in gaza and then subject and compelled to moving against hamas and gaza to quell attacks within her borders and upon her own citizens (a prospect quite real to the egyptians, i assure you), or the citizens of israel, do you think that egypt would apply military force this humanely and this discretely upon either hamas, or upon the “citizens” of gaza?  i would suggest to you that the actions of the jordanians in expelling the p.l.o. from its borders and territory years ago, suggests the answer.

to this point, i have dealt with what i consider the internal structure of ambassador bolton’s argument for a three state solution, and have not considered arguments outside of the dynamics of how such a solution might function in the world of what used to be called real politic in my day, and is now labeled geo-politics.  i have dealt with matters of interstate dynamics, and with military matters. i have not dealt at all, with right is right, and what is moral, and what it means to a nation to have something like the plan mr. bolton is suggesting imposed upon a place, a country like israel, a vision like israel.  as a matter of fact, i have not really considered israel apart from any overall consideration of the behaviors and expectations of all the parties.

i now depart from this.  and, if they are not apparent, i readily admit my partisan favor and bias for all that is israel as against all that is islam and all that is arab.

by my values, the values of islam are abhorrent if not evil.  it is not so much a religion as a tool to wield religion as a matter of political conquest and control.   it is medieval, and has never moved past the conquest of its birth.

by my lights, for israel to give up one square inch of her territory to either jordan or egypt is an anathema, and is abhorrent. by my lights, that israeli politicians could contemplate doing so is a total mystery, and it seems to me to violate every bond and promise of a political leader to preserve and protect the heritage and values which underpin a country like israel.  do not misunderstand me, this is not an attack upon ambassador bolton or impugning of his integrity or commitment to the values of the united states, nor of his demonstrated commitment to the fight against islamic jihad or muslim terror. ambassador bolton merely contemplates that which israeli politicians have contemplated, and which others have tried to fob off on israel, and that is statehood for the gazans and the west bank, though not via the status of independent states..

ambassador bolton puts the matter plainly in his post to the Washington post.  he says: “israel should accept political and administrative roles by jordan and egypt, unless it intends to perform such role itself (which it manifestly does not.)”

this is the language a gifted diplomat uses when he says, “shit, or get off the pot.”  this is mr. bolton saying that if israel wants dominion over these territories, then she should govern them, and if she is not willing to govern them, then she should give them up.  i have some sympathy with these remarks, though i do not agree with them in the slightest.

there is the matter of my religious views, adverted to above.  i am firmly rooted within the judeo-christian ethic, and regard those teachings & values with which i was raised and to which i adhere, and to me these beliefs dictate that israel hang on to every scrap of land and every square inch of it, no matter the “complications” and “inconsistencies” involved.

and, finally there are the issues of strategic military necessity.—to the extent that a scrap of ground has an strategic or tactical value at all, it should be clung to with tenacious fervor and zeal, and fought for, as many times as it takes to secure it.  now, ambassador bolton does not advocate the golan or the farms as trade bait, as some as advocated, but, to my lights, i find no difference in giving up the golan, and in giving up gaza, or in giving up the west bank.  those regions are needed for their strategic value, in defending against either syrian, or egyptian, or jordanian attack.  it has happened before, it will quite likely happen again.  to give up one square inch of ground simply means one square inch of ground which has to be regained in order to secure israel’s strategic needs to defend against armor and artillery.

to me, each piece of ground is sacred.
each piece of ground, every square inch is strategic.

< i will not tell you what i think of the present israeli leadership which allows arab excavation of artifacts precious to judaism and christianity from the temple mount by arab entities, except to say that it is to allow desecration, and that it is despicable on the part of israeli politicians: really quite gutless. in summary.—

for mr. bolton to make his case, it seems to me that he has to logically demonstrate that all of the following conditions could occur, and indeed, that it is probable that they would occur if the proper conditions could be established:

1.)that the states of egypt and jordan are willing to exert governmental rule and incorporate gaza and the west bank into their countries.

2.)that the arab states can quell hamas, and control its terrorism and its desire to destabilize the region better than was done by israel and either eliminate or decrease significantly the terror emanating from them and directed towards israel.

3.)that israel will perceive and be convinced that this is possible, to the extent that she believes the possibility of resultant nation state war between she and the arabs will not occur as a reasonable probability.  and,

4.)the arab states having the territories as suggested in “the three-state option” lessons the prospects of war between nation states, and this has to be proven to the satisfaction of egypt and jordan.

mr. bolton has chosen to make this proposal in the confines of two pages, a daunting task by any measure.  in some sense it is not entirely fair to level criticisms at him that he might otherwise have forestalled in a longer article.  and, i have seen mr. bolton before a live audience, as an audience member, and i have no doubt of his formidable intellect and his bulldog tenacity in advancing his position, and in defending it.  but, mr. bolton chose his forum, and he chose to take his proposal into the public debate clearly understanding the handicaps he had imposed on himself and his argument, and the infirmities it apparently reveals in its brevity.

he wants to change status quo, and he wants to change the status quo with a plan not entirely fleshed out: this has been his choice.  in legal circles, if you want to change the status quo, you have a burden of proof and persuasion that your case is legally sufficient to effect change, and change the status quo for better.  mr. bolton ought to face similar burdens of proof here, if nothing else, at least being able to supply sufficient assurance that it is workable, such that simple prudence is suggests that it merits further exploration, let alone going ahead with it as a matter of policy.  There should be no departure from the virtues and comforts and predictabilities of the present situation, unless it can be shown that pursuit of a different plan is prudent and capable of achieving success without making the world, and the middle east, any more dangerous than it already is.  in my view he has not even come close to sustaining such a burden. surely, for mr. bolton’s plan to have credence, need it not sustain the tests of logic, of history, and of simple prudence?  it does not do so, in my estimation, because it does not demonstrate what is wrong with the current status quo, and it does not do so because it does not demonstrate how departing from the status quo is to the benefit of the u.s., or of israel, or of the west.  it does not so because it does not and cannot demonstrate that mr. bolton’s proposed solution augers any better for peace and stability than does the status quo. john jay @ 12.06.2009

post script.  political and historical judgments are harsh, often very hard to bear.  the fact of the matter is that the people of gaza have contrived to put themselves under the dictatorial rule of a group of murderous fanatical religious thugs, with results odious to her neighbors, and disastrous to herself. gaza has presented the world with a situation unsolvable by reason and diplomacy, and containable only by brute force.  this situation gaza brought on herself.  this situation only gaza can correct, by throwing off the yoke of this dictatorship, and by following the normative behaviors of other civilized countries. this is a very harsh reality.  no efforts to bring gaza into the fold of civilized countries, to expect of her normative behaviors, can be expected until gaza rectifies this herself.  the only alternative to this is the present situation which obtains, the resort by her neighbors to military force to protect themselves from gaza.

Comments

[Shy Guy]

Wow! What a read! My head is spinning.

My suggestion: voluntary and therafter forced transfer of all of the Arabs out of Israel. To Lebanon. To Jordan. To Egypt. I couldn't care less. If it was good enough for the Jews of Gush Katif, it's good enough for the terrorists and fifth columnists on the land of Israel.

The day will come.